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I. INTRODUCTION
Should the United States detain noncitizens, either while
they are waiting for their removal hearings or while the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) prepares to
execute final removal orders? If so, should the law mandate
detention for specified categories of noncitizens, or permit case-
by-case detention decisions?
These questions are topical. Recent legislation, discussed
below, mandates the detention of several broad groups of
potentially removable noncitizens. The questions are also
politically charged since public debate is dominated by a tension
between two concerns. Detention proponents focus on deterring
illegal immigration and removing noncitizens who commit
crimes. They consider detention vital to these enforcement
goals.' Opponents emphasize the liberty interests at stake, the
1. See generally Peter A. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A 'White Paper," 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667 (1997).
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cruelty of long-term detention, and the huge and often wasteful
2
expense.
Until 1988, the INS had a limited statutory discretion
whether to detain a noncitizen pending either a deportation
hearing or execution of a final deportation order.4 The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created the concept of the "aggravated
felony," defining it narrowly to include murder, drug trafficking,
and firearms trafficking, and also made conviction of an
aggravated felony a ground for deportation and mandated
detention for any aggravated felon awaiting his or her
deportation hearing.5 Most courts held this mandatory detention
provision unconstitutional.6 They reasoned that procedural due
process requires a hearing on the issue of whether the individual
is likely to abscond or otherwise threaten the community, at least
if the person is a lawful permanent resident of the United
States.7
Two comprehensive statutes enacted in 1996-the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act8 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act'
(IIRIRA)-extended mandatory detention to an additional five
major categories. First, mandatory detention now applies to
almost all noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable on
crime-related grounds-not just to those convicted of aggravated
felonies." Second, noncitizens who are either inadmissible or
deportable on terrorist grounds must be detained." Third,
2. See, e.g., Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996
Immigration Act: An Exercise in Overkill, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1433 (Oct. 19, 1998);
Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, INS Detention Policies Criticized, 3 BENDER'S
IMMIGR. BULL. 1079 (Nov. 1, 1998).
3. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a) (pre-1988), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)
(1988) [hereinafter INA]; 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1988). See generally Paul W. Schmidt,
Detention of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305, 307-10 (1987).
4. See INA § 242(c)-(d) (pre-1988), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)-(d) (1988); 8 C.F.R. §§
243.3(a), 212.5(a) (1988).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7341, 7343(a), 7344, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-71 (Nov. 18,
1988). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988).
6. For some of the cases, see Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 1435 nn.17-18;
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 87-89 (2d ed. 1997).
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996).
9. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Div. C (Sept. 30, 1996).
10. See INA § 236(cX1)(A)-(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(C). A narrow exception
protects potential government witnesses. See INA § 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
11. See INA § 236(c)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D). The potential government
witness exception also applies to this category. See INA § 236(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).
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subject to some narrow exceptions, arriving passengers whom
immigration inspectors find inadmissible must be detained
pending a full removal hearing."2 Fourth, under a special new
procedure known as "expedited removal," certain arriving
passengers may be removed without a hearing if the immigration
inspector suspects either fraud or insufficient documentation."
This procedure applies even to asylum claimants if they lack the
required documents, unless they can establish a "credible fear" of
persecution." The expedited removal process triggers mandatory
detention of asylum claimants at least until "credible fear" has
been found and perhaps afterwards as well. 5 Fifth, a noncitizen
who has been ordered removed must be detained until the
removal order is executed, at least if it is executed within ninety
days.
1 6
Recognizing that so radical an expansion of mandatory
detention would require the INS to scramble for both additional
detention space and additional personnel, Congress authorized
the Attorney General to defer the implementation of these new
provisions for up to two years. 7 The Attorney General exercised
that authority for the two-year maximum. 8 During that period
12. See INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The narrow exceptions are
found in INA § 235(b)(2)(B)-(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)-(C).
13. See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
14. See INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii),
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii).
15. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(BXiii)(IV). Surprisingly,
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), appears to mandate detention pending
a full hearing even if the asylum officer finds a credible fear. Yet, § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), implies otherwise. Perhaps detention is not mandatory if
the asylum officer finds no credible fear but an immigration judge reverses that decision
and orders a full hearing under INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). Clarification is needed.
16. See INA § 241(a)(1)-(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(3). Note, however, the odd
wording of § 241(a)(2). After saying that the Attorney General "shall" detain the person
during the removal period, it goes on to say that "[u]nder no circumstances during the
removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who has been found
inadmissible . . . or deportable under [certain criminal and national security grounds]."
Id. Does the second sentence imply that there are circumstances under which individuals
who have been found inadmissible or deportable on other grounds may be released? If so,
how can that result be reconciled with the first sentence? If not, then what is the point of
the second sentence?
17. See IIRIRA, supra note 9, at § 303(b)(2)-(3).
18. See INS Commissioner Invokes Detention Transition Rules for Another Year, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1552 (Oct. 10, 1997); INS State Dept. Begin Implementing New
Law, Congress Passes Corrections Bill, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1418-19 (Oct. 11,
1996).
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detention was governed by statutory "transition period custody
rules," which gave the Attorney General the discretion to waive
detention in certain specified cases."5 With the expiration of the
transition period on October 9, 1998,0 the permanent new
mandatory detention provisions are now in effect. Within weeks
a federal district court in Colorado held mandatory detention
hearings for persons awaiting removal on crime-related
grounds."
This article will not address the constitutionality of
mandatory detention. That subject has been examined
elsewhere.22 Nor will it examine the important issues concerning
the conditions of confinement in INS facilities. Others have
thoughtfully explored that subject.2 The range of difficult
management issues that confront the INS is likewise beyond the
scope of this article, but an excellent, comprehensive account has
recently appeared."
Rather, this article will consider how detention decisions
should be made. The issue is a familiar one to lawyers-fixed
rules versus administrative discretion.25 Should the criteria be
predetermined, as they are now, by fixed rules which make
detention mandatory in specified categories of cases? Or should
the relevant government officials make individualized, case-by-
case determinations, after the person has had a fair opportunity
to be heard? This article argues for the latter.
19. See IIRIRA, supra note 9, at § 303(b)(3)(B).
20. See Memorandum of INS Associate Executive Commissioner Michael Pearson
(Oct. 7, 1998), reprinted in 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1114 (Nov. 1, 1998).
21. On December 14, 1998, the court held that procedural due process entails the
right to a hearing at which the individual can attempt to prove he or she was not likely to
abscond or pose a threat to the community. See Karen Abbott, Immigration Ruling Has
Quick Impact, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec. 28, 1998. As a result of the
decision, Justice Department officials in Colorado have begun providing bond hearings to
affected noncitizens. See id.
22. See, LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 87-89.
23. See, e.g., Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 2; Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 2;
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the
Porous Borders of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995).
24. See Schuck, supra note 1. See also VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE
APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: ATTAINING COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS
THROUGH COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (1998) [hereinafter VERA].
25. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity
and the Formation of Energy Policy Through an Exception Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163
(1984).
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Part II assesses the theories for, or purposes of, detaining
noncitizens in connection with removal proceedings. Part III
examines the social, economic, and personal costs of detention.
Part IV uses the conclusions reached in Parts II and III to
compare the relative merits of mandatory detention and case-by-
case adjudication.
II. THEORIES OF DETENTION
What, exactly, is the point of detaining someone pending
either a determination of removability or the execution of a final
removal order? Several theories are worth considering.
Unlike the incarceration imposed as part of a criminal
sentence, the detention of noncitizens in connection with removal
proceedings is not meant as punishment.2  Nor, to my
knowledge, has any scholar sought to justify such detention on
punishment grounds. There is good reason not to advance such
an argument. The imposition of punishment would trigger the
full range of procedural safeguards that the Constitution
provides for criminal proceedings-"the Fifth Amendment bar on
double jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy, public
jury trial and to counsel, the Eighth Amendment prohibitions on
excessive bail and on cruel and unusual punishment, the ex post
facto clause, and other provisions. "27 In any event, punishment
would not explain pre-hearing detention, because in those cases
there has not yet been any finding of wrongdoing.
Rather, the detention of noncitizens in connection with
removal proceedings has been grounded on three other theories.
Two of these theories-preventing individuals from absconding
and isolating those who pose a danger to the community-
correspond to the traditional justifications for pretrial detention
in criminal cases.28 A third possible theory is that the detention
of noncitizens might deter certain types of immigration violations
in the first place. The discussion that follows examines the
strength and applicability of these various theories.
26. Nor is removal itself. See, e.g., Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
27. LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 44.
28. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). There are limitations to the
criminal analogy, as Peter Schuck has noted. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 671, 680.
[Vol. 30:3
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A. Preventing People from Absconding
The most obvious theory for detaining noncitizens in
connection with removal proceedings is to prevent them from
absconding before the INS can remove them. This problem is
real. Of those who are not detained, approximately one-third fail
to appear for their removal hearings.29  Before mandatory
detention, about ninety percent of non-detained persons who
were ordered removed failed to surrender themselves for
removal."0
The reasons are varied. Some people did not receive notice of
their court dates; others misunderstood the process; still others
believe the INS lacks the practical capacity to punish them.31 In
addition, if someone wishes to enter the United States and the
INS alleges that he or she is inadmissible, or if someone wishes
to remain in the United States and the INS alleges that he or she
is deportable, the person might conclude there is little to lose by
absconding.32 As Peter Schuck has noted, many noncitizens in
removal proceedings might also believe that absconding will buy
them additional time in the United States and that, if
apprehended, they will incur no sanctions beyond the removal
that otherwise awaited them.33
A concern about absconding might partly explain why
Congress selected the particular mandatory detention categories
that it did. Possibly, for example, arriving aliens are more likely
to abscond than deportable noncitizens are. In criminal
proceedings, strong community ties increase the chance that a
released defendant will appear in court.34 Whether the same
pattern carries over to removal proceedings is not yet known.
More likely, Congress's decision to detain arriving (versus
deportable) noncitizens reflects its (limited) recognition that
29. See VERA, supra note 24, at 6.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. One qualification is that the failure to appear at a removal hearing can render a
person ineligible for certain remedies for ten years. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 464.
33. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 671-72. Schuck acknowledges that in such cases
the immigration laws now authorize additional sanctions, including criminal and civil
penalties and the loss of future immigration benefits. See id. He suggests, however, that
in the typical case these sanctions will not be of concern because they are unlikely to be
imposed. See id.
34. See VERA, supra note 24, at 7.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
people who have already settled in the United States and lain
down roots typically have greater liberty interests at stake than
do people arriving at a United States port of entry for the first
time.35
The singling out of asylum claimants is especially difficult to
justify. Either the claimant truly fears persecution or he or she
does not. If the fear is genuine, there might indeed be an
additional incentive to abscond-the possibility of an erroneous
denial and subsequent return. But the detention of genuine
asylum seekers would seem hard to reconcile with humanitarian
values. And if the fear is not genuine, then there is no apparent
reason to think that the person is any more likely to abscond
than is a deportable noncitizen or, for that matter, anyone who is
subject to expedited removal but who is not seeking asylum.
Applicants found to have established "credible" fears of
persecution admittedly are a harder case. The finding of a
credible fear surely increases the probability that the fear in fact
is genuine, but it does not increase the probability to one
hundred percent. I concede, therefore, that the detention of a
person who credibly fears persecution but who has not yet finally
established refugee status, while in my view both inhumane and
unwise, cannot be dismissed as irrational.
Similarly, one might ask whether noncitizens who are
deportable on either criminal or terrorist grounds are, as a class,
any more likely to abscond than are those noncitizens who are
deportable on any other grounds. Of course, any noncitizen who
wants to remain in the United States but who faces the risk of
removal has some incentive to abscond. Does the probability rise
when the removal ground relates to crime or terrorism? One
possibility is that a person who has been convicted of a qualifying
crime or is suspected of terrorism is more likely to be generally
prone to furtive conduct. Another possibility is that, because
people deportable on either criminal or terrorist grounds are less
likely to qualify for discretionary relief from removal,"6 Congress
considered them more likely to fear removal if apprehended. I
can find no evidence, however, that either of these possibilities
influenced Congress's decision to select the criminal or terrorist
35. As Peter Schuck observed in reviewing an earlier draft of this article, the higher
stakes typically possessed by deportable noncitizens if anything give them greater, not
lesser, incentive to abscond.
36. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 464.
[Vol. 30:3
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categories for mandatory detention. More probably, mandatory
detention for criminals and terrorists is premised instead on
public safety grounds, discussed below.
Perhaps the most justifiable mandatory detention category is
noncitizens to whom final removal orders have already been
issued. Because the final order effectively eliminates one's hope
for a favorable legal outcome, absconding will be an attractive
option in many cases."
B. Protecting the Safety of the Public
At first glance, protecting the public from individuals who
have violated our immigration laws seems unobjectionable. But
this rationale is actually quite limited. It has no apparent
application to several of the present mandatory detention
categories. Arriving passengers found inadmissible, asylum
seekers in expedited removal proceedings, and those people
whose removal orders have been finalized do not pose any
systematically greater threat to the public safety than does
anyone else who is suspected of failing to meet our immigration
criteria.
Even if the ground for inadmissibility or deportability is a
criminal conviction, mandatory detention seems questionable.
There is no reason to believe that a noncitizen who has completed
his or her criminal sentence poses a greater danger to the
community than does a United States citizen who has committed
the same offense.8 Moreover, if Congress or a state legislature
feels that those who commit particular crimes remain dangerous
to the community even after completion of their sentences, then
the more logical remedy is to lengthen the maximum criminal
sentences for those offenses, for citizens and noncitizens alike.
Of the various categories of aliens subject to mandatory
detention, the terrorist category is the one to which the public
safety rationale seems most applicable. By definition, a person
37. See, supra, note 34 and accompanying text.
38. The immediate response might be that there is nothing wrong with treating
noncitizens less favorably than citizens. Here, however, I am not suggesting that the
deportation of alien criminal offenders is never justified. I am suggesting merely that
there is no systemic reason to believe that noncitizens who have fully served their
criminal sentences pose any special danger to the public safety such that detention is
required.
539
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whom the government regards as affirmatively desirous of
violence and harm presumably poses a higher than usual threat
to the public safety.
C. Deterring Immigration Violations
The deterrence rationale for detention is also quite limited.
It has no convincing application to those who are removable on
either criminal or terrorist grounds. In theory the prospect of
being detained pending the removal hearing could discourage
someone from committing a serious crime. In practice, however,
far greater deterrents-the criminal penalties that attach to the
kinds of crimes Congress deems serious enough to trigger
removal, combined with the removal itself-dwarf any additional
detention connected to the removal proceeding. Similarly, it is
hard to imagine that a person who is willing to risk removal from
the United States would shy away from deportable behavior
merely to avoid being detained from the time of the final removal
order to the time of actual removal.
Rather, the deterrence rationale seems more realistically
applicable to the other mandatory detention categories-arriving
passengers believed to be inadmissible, and asylum claimants in
expedited removal proceedings. The prospect of lengthy
detention might be thought to dissuade inadmissible noncitizens
from traveling to the United States. It might also be thought
useful as a device for discouraging unfounded asylum claims. In
each case, there are two possible subvariants of this deterrence
theory. Under the first subvariant, the unpleasantness of the
detention itself might deter the person from seeking entry.
Under the second subvariant, the detention defeats any incentive
to travel to the United States in the hope of remaining at large
pending the hearing and then going underground.
D. Different Theories for Different Categories
As the above discussion suggests, no one theory explains all
of the present mandatory detention categories. Each category is
arguably justified by one or more theories. As Part IV
demonstrates, however, it is essential to distinguish the potential
benefits of mandatory detention from the more tailored benefits
of discretionary, case-by-case, detention decisions.
[Vol. 30:3
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Thus, as illustrated above, the detention theory most
pertinent to arriving passengers generally and to asylum
claimants in expedited removal proceedings is deterrence. For
me, none of the three detention theories persuasively explains
the singling out of noncitizens convicted of, and punished for
crimes, though the public safety theory comes closest. The public
safety theory is the principal rationale for the detention of
terrorists. As for noncitizens subject to final removal orders, the
central theory is the prevention of absconding.
III. COSTS OF DETENTION
A. Private Sector Costs
Probably the most self-evident cost of detention is the human
cost. By definition, detention is a deprivation of liberty.
Detainees cannot work, cannot go to school, cannot meaningfully
socialize, cannot travel beyond the bounds of their facilities, and
are cut off from family and friends. Of course, the deprivation is
mutual. Family members and friends similarly lose the benefits
of the detainee's companionship. If the detainee is an asylum
claimant, all these deprivations are magnified by the trauma
that impelled the person to flee in the first place. For precisely
that reason, many commentators oppose the routine detention of
asylum claimants." The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees also strongly opposes the detention of
asylum seekers, in the absence of exceptional circumstances
found after individualized determinations.4"
Because detention also prevents employment, those
detainees who would otherwise have been able to work-e.g.
lawful permanent residents who are removable on crime-related
grounds-suffer economic loss as well. The same can be said of
their dependents, who might also be lawful permanent residents
39. See, e.g., Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 1440 (arguing against detainment
at least until Congress appropriates enough funds to assure decent confinement
conditions); Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 2, at 1082 (expressing the authors' own
opinions and that of Amnesty International).
40. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Press Release, UNHCR
Guidelines Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers (Feb. 1999) available at
<http'//www.unhcr.ch> [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
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or United States citizens, and of all others who would benefit
from their productivity.
Finally, detention impairs the person's ability to prepare his
or her case. Once detained, a person ordinarily experiences
diminished access to counsel, interpreters, and documentary
evidence.4
B. Public Costs
The public also incurs large economic costs. Detention itself
costs the public approximately $66 per person, per day, and
sometimes more.42 In the case of a detainee who would otherwise
have been gainfully employed, the federal and state governments
lose the income tax revenues that the person would have
provided and might even incur the affirmative costs of public
assistance.
The significance of all these losses is greatest when the
person is being detained pending a hearing or an appeal and the
person ultimately prevails on the merits. In such instances,
hindsight permits a conclusion that the liberty and economic
losses that the government has inflicted were not only
unnecessary but also unjust." In criminal cases, the limitations
on pretrial detention reflect the presumed innocence of the
detainees. An analogous observation is possible here. The
detainee might well be found not to be inadmissible or
deportable, or might be granted discretionary relief."
41. See VERA, supra note 24, at 6.
42. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 672. In fiscal year 1998, the INS spent $733 million
to detain and remove aliens. See Kerwin & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 1436.
43. This argument is inapplicable to those who have already received all of the
hearings and appeals to which they are entitled and are now being detained only pending
execution of their removal orders.
44. Another example of unnecessary detention, of course, is that in which the person
in fact would not have absconded or posed a threat to the public. The INS will never
know precisely which persons were unnecessarily detained in that sense. This
consideration goes to the issue of mandatory detention versus discretionary case-by-case
assessment of risk and is discussed in Part IV infra.
[Vol. 30:3
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IV. MANDATORY DETENTION VERSUS CASE-BY-CASE
DETERMINATIONS
The preceding discussion illustrates that detention in
connection with removal proceedings entails both benefits and
costs. Do the benefits outweigh the costs? The answer, surely, is
that in some cases they do and in some cases they do not.
The question, then, is how best to identify those cases in
which the benefits of detention outweigh the costs. The IIRIRA
approach described in the Introduction is to create fixed rules
that make detention mandatory in certain designated categories
of cases. The opposite approach, generally in force before
IIRIRA, is case-by-case adjudication in which the presiding
officer makes findings concerning the likelihood that the person
will either abscond or pose a threat to the public safety.4"
All the theories of mandatory detention necessarily assume
that certain cases have enough in common to make rough
generalizations possible. As discussed in the Introduction, the
present law lumps together: 1) most non-expedited removal cases
involving arriving passengers; 2) expedited removal cases
involving asylum claimants, criminal cases, terrorist cases; and
3) cases in which final removal orders have already been issued.
This Part of the article compares the merits of categorical,
mandatory detention with the merits of individualized, case-by-
case determinations of the person's likelihood of absconding or
threatening the public safety. It begins by identifying and
evaluating three theories for making detention mandatory in
selected categories. It then considers the merits of case-by-case
adjudication.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
46. For a superb study of the exercise of discretion by immigration judges in bond
redetermination hearings, see Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The
Role of Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (1987).
543
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A. Theories of Mandatory Detention
1. Saving Money
The most obvious advantage of mandatory detention is that
it avoids the expense of individual hearings. With scarce
resources, that advantage cannot be dismissed casually. Still,
the financial argument has several limitations.47
First, out of deference to the liberty interests at stake, we
willingly accept the cost of pretrial hearings before we detain
people suspected of crimes. Why should we be any less willing to
provide hearings before detaining people suspected to be
removable?
To some, the inherent differences between citizens and
noncitizens might be enough of an answer. Citizens, being
widely regarded as possessing greater membership rights than
noncitizens, might be assumed entitled to greater procedural
safeguards before being detained. As relevant as the distinction
is to one's interest in entering or remaining in the United States,
however, fundamental liberty interests like freedom from pretrial
detention should not hinge on one's citizenship status. Even in
the criminal context, the law of pretrial detention does not
distinguish based on the citizenship status of the suspect.
Moreover, certain noncitizens-including lawfully admitted
permanent residents and asylum claimants-have special
interests at stake. Finally, as noted earlier," the detention of
noncitizens can affect the family members and others as well,
both economically and emotionally. These other affected
individuals might well be United States citizens.
Others might seek to reconcile our conflicting pretrial
detention policies by invoking factors specific to the removal
47. In addition to the issues raised in this subsection, there is an empirical question
of whether mandatory detention actually does save money. Possibly it is more expensive
than a system of individual hearings.
48. Many scholars, far too numerous to cite, have provided thoughtful commentary
on the degrees of membership, and the corresponding rights of, citizens and aliens. See,
e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9 (1990); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165 (1983).
49. See discussion supra Part III.A
[Vol. 30:3
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process. Peter Schuck offers at least two arguments for
questioning the analogy to the criminal context. First, he
suggests the noncitizen who is at large pending a removal
hearing has less incentive to show up and to refrain from
misconduct than does his or her counterpart in criminal
proceedings. The latter, Schuck observes, needs to worry about
loss of parole, a harsher sentence, and reputation in his or her
permanent community."0 As Schuck acknowledges, however, the
enactment of IIRIRA gives analogous incentives to noncitizens in
removal hearings, who may now be subjected to criminal
punishment, civil fines, and a loss of future immigration benefits
if they fail to appear. 1  Second, he observes, criminal
enforcement authorities typically have more information about a
suspect's character, community ties, and other personal
information than immigration authorities have in removal
cases. 2 Arguably, however, that observation begs the question.
If individual hearings were required before noncitizens could be
detained during removal proceedings, the authorities who
preside over those hearings would receive the relevant
information from the opposing sides. The questions are whether
such a hearing ought to be required and what level of resources
should be invested to attain the desired level of reliability.
2. Avoiding False Negatives
No matter how thorough a case-by-case detention
determination process is, and how talented and diligent the
hearing officer is, errors are possible. Predictions about the
likelihood that a given person will abscond or pose a threat to the
public safety are inherently perilous. Not all the material
evidence will always be discovered or presented. Not all the
findings of primary fact will be accurate. Even if all the raw
information is complete and accurate, not all predictions of future
events will pan out. One theory of mandatory detention,
therefore, is that it avoids what I shall call false negatives-i.e.,
cases in which the hearing officer predicts that the person will
neither abscond nor threaten the public and consequently
50. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 671-72.
51. See id. The weight that this point commands of course depends on noncitizens'
perceptions of the likelihood that such consequences will actually occur.
52. See id. at 672.
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releases the person on bond, and the prediction proves wrong.
Mandatory detention eliminates that risk.
That benefit, of course, comes at a price-a certain number
of false positives. This problem is discussed below.53 Moreover,
the question remains why false negatives are tolerated in the
criminal context but not in the removal context. The opposing
positions on this issue seem the same as those in the preceding
analogous discussion of the fiscal impact of mandatory detention.
3. Deterring Immigration Violations
Earlier discussion highlighted one of the most commonly
invoked arguments for detention-deterring immigration
violations in the first place.54 Arguably, making the detention
mandatory makes the deterrent stronger. The theory would be
that the prospect of lengthy detention will discourage people from
attempting surreptitious entries or traveling to the United States
to file unfounded asylum claims.
Again, there are corresponding costs, and they are all
discussed in subsection (B) below. As the earlier discussion
demonstrated, these benefits are most applicable to the two
categories of mandatory detention just mentioned-not, for
example, to the mandatory detention of persons deportable solely
on criminal or terrorist grounds or persons already ordered
removed.55
B. Theories of Individualized Adjudication
1. Avoiding False Positives
Mandatory detention inevitably generates a certain number
of false positives-i.e., those people who are detained because
they fall within one of the statutorily prescribed categories but
who in fact would not have absconded or caused any harm to the
community if released. In each of these cases, all the costs
associated with detention are needlessly incurred. Those costs,
53. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
54. See discussion supra Part HC.
55. See id.
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discussed in Part III, include the deprivation of individual
liberty, the inability to work, socialize, or travel, the isolation
from friends, family, and community, the reciprocal losses of
those from whom the detainees are cut off, the economic losses
for those detainees who would otherwise have been permitted to
work, and the increased public costs of providing detention,
paying public assistance to the detainee's dependents in some
cases, and foregoing the income tax revenue that the detained
person's employment would have generated. These losses add up
to great waste of both human and financial resources.
Conversely, many persons who do not fall within any of the
categories predesignated for mandatory detention might well
present real risks of absconding or real dangers to the public
safety. Every time the INS is required to use a detention bed for
a person who in fact poses no threat at all, it has one fewer bed
available for a person who poses a threat and whom the INS
would have had the discretion to detain. This factor is
significant. On any given day, there are approximately 125,000
persons in removal proceedings, but the INS has only 14,000
detention beds." To the extent that mandatory detention is
intended to minimize false negatives, therefore, the strategy
might even be counterproductive.
2. Cutting Corners on Humane Treatment
Stanley Mailman and Stephen Yale-Loehr make another
strong argument against mandatory detention. By exacerbating
the pressure on the INS to find adequate bed space, mandatory
detention forces the INS to rely increasingly heavily on contracts
with privately run facilities where some of the least humane
conditions prevail."
3. Deterring Enforcement of the Immigration Laws
Ironically, mandatory detention might have the effect of
discouraging immigration officials from zealously enforcing the
immigration laws. One INS district director, commenting on the
space crunch at the local INS detention facility, stated he "would
56. See VERA, supra note 24, at 6.
57. See Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 2, at 1081.
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strongly consider not starting deportation proceedings against
felons-especially if their offenses were minor or committed
years ago.""8
4. Avoiding Detention Costs
As discussed earlier, one of the assumed benefits of
mandatory detention is to avoid the fiscal costs that individual
bond hearings would entail. There are, however, countervailing
financial considerations.
First, a certain proportion of those who receive individual
bond hearings will prevail. The detention costs are saved in
those cases.
Second, of those who are set free after bond hearings, any
who end up absconding will forfeit their bonds. As acknowledged
earlier, these "false negatives" are clearly a disadvantage of case-
by-case adjudication. For purposes of assessing the total fiscal
impact, however, the revenue from the forfeited bonds must also
be counted. Thus, the fiscal impact of the individual hearing
approach approximately equals the cost of the hearings, minus
the cost of the detentions that the hearings avoid, minus any
forfeited bonds. Because of these latter factors, one cannot
assume that dispensing with hearings saves money. It is equally
possible that hearings would generate a net financial gain.
Empirical study would be needed to calculate the net impact of
mandatory detention for each of the statutory categories to which
it applies.
Moreover, middle ground exists. In September 1996, the
INS asked the Vera Institute of Justice, a private nonprofit
organization, to develop a supervised release program to replace
detention in appropriate cases." Its initial findings look
promising. As of December 31, 1997, about eighty percent of all
those in its "Appearance Assistance Program" showed up for
their removal hearings."0
58. See Abbott, supra note 21 (quoting Joseph Greene, INS District Director,
Denver).
59. See VERA, supra note 24, at 5.
60. See id. at 15-16 (but data are preliminary). Accord, UINHCR Guidelines, supra
note 40, at Guideline 4 (advocating alternatives to detention).
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V. CONCLUSION
Public concern about illegal immigration is real and
legitimate. So, too, is the public concern about those immigrants
who commit crimes. The detention of aliens pending either
removal hearings or the execution of removal orders is, and
undoubtedly always will be, one vital tool in addressing those
concerns. While detained, one cannot abscond or endanger the
public. In addition, the mere prospect of detention might well
deter some of the worst violations of United States immigration
law. For all those reasons, detention serves a useful enforcement
function-in certain cases.
And there lies the rub. Detention also entails huge costs-
for the detained person, for his or her family and friends, and for
the public. The question, therefore, is how to select those cases
in which the benefits of detention outweigh the costs. One
method, now in place in the removal context as a result of recent
legislation, relies on fixed rules. This approach mandates
detention in specified categories of cases. Another method, long
employed in the context of pretrial detention in criminal cases,
and until recently in immigration cases as well, is to hold
individual hearings to determine whether the person can safely
be released on bond.
Part IV of this paper outlined the relative benefits of these
competing approaches. I there acknowledged the advantages of
the mandatory approach but argued that they are quite limited.
In contrast, mandatory detention poses great dangers that case-
by-case adjudication would avoid at minimal social and economic
cost. When the liberty interests are as great as they inherently
are in the detention context, a hearing seems a small price to pay
for security with honor.
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